GISC - Research topics in socioeconomic systems, game theory and related subjects
Evolutionary game theory in structured populations
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How can cooperative acts evolve among populations of selfish individuals? In this scenario each simulation agent is an individual who interacts with others playing a repeated game, e.g. the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) or the Public Goods Game (PGG). Using numerical simulations, we measure cooperation levels when the system evolves according to different strategy update rules. We also study how network topologies such as random graphs, social network models, scale-free networks or spatial networks can influence the system dynamics. This game-theoretical framework approximates many socio-economic scenarios that we daily experience when cooperative norms and conventions spread throughout our society. The results of this research line can then be tested in controlled behavioral experiments with human participants.
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Stability of electoral systems: a computational study
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The vulnerability of democratic processes is under scrutiny after
scandals related to Cambrige Analytica (2016 U.S. elections, the Brexit referendum, and elections in Kenya). The deceptive use of social media in the US, the European Union and several Asian countries, increased social and political polarization across world regions. Finally, there are straightforward frauds like Crimea referendum and Belarus elections. These challenges are eroding democracy, the most frequent source of governmental power, and raise multiple questions about its vulnerabilities.
Democratic systems have countless ways of performing elections, which create different electoral systems (ES). It is therefore in citizens' interest to study and understand how different ESs relate to different vulnerabilities and contemporary challenges. These systems can be analyzed using network science in various layers -- they involve a network of voters in the first place, a network of electoral districts connected by commuting flow for instance, or a network of political parties to give a few examples. The electoral system together with the underlying voting processes and opinion dynamics can be seen as a complex system.
It is essential to provide new tools and arguments to the discussion on the evaluation of electoral systems. We aim at comparing different ESs in a dynamical framework. The novel approach of analyzing electoral systems in such way with all its aspects included, from opinion dynamics in the population of voters to inter-district commuting patterns to seat appointment methods, can help discovering vulnerabilities of real-world electoral systems.
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